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Introduction
Dissociation is one of the two main categories which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
distinguish in their taxonomy of argumentative techniques (the other being association). They
define dissociation as an argumentation scheme in which the speaker separates elements which
previously were considered by the auditorium as a whole or a conceptual unit (1969, 190). An
example is the separation of the concept of 'law' into two new concepts, 'the letter of the law' and
'the spirit of the law'. The purpose of dissociation is to remedy an incompatibility or
contradiction. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca view dissociation, in which a more or less
profound change is brought about in the conceptual basis of an argument, as different from an
attack against an association, through which elements which were previously separate are
connected or brought together (1969, 412).
Up till now, not much study has been made of dissociation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
are the only authors who have treated the technique in detail.1 But their treatment, apart from the
fact that it suffers, like their work in general, from a lack of consistency and method, has the
drawback that it, being rhetorical in nature, has a monologual orientation.2
A number of authors have pointed out that dissociation, even though it is an argumentative
technique in the sense of a means to influence the point of view of an opponent, contrary to what
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca claim, is not an argumentation scheme. Garssen (1997, 72)
states:
[dissociation] is not a specific way to relate a starting point with a standpoint in
such a way that the acceptance of the standpoint is increased. (…) Dissociation,
at the most, can play a role before the speaker brings forward his argument: he
performs a dissociation in a concept and subsequently makes use of this in the
argument for his standpoint'. Grootendorst (1999) views dissociation as an
attempt to change one of the common starting points of the protagonist and the
antagonist (1999, 286).

There are many aspects of dissociation that merit further study. First, there is the conceptual
problem that the difference between, in general, making a distinction and, particularly,
dissociation is not always sharp (Goodwin 1991, 1992). A first task would be conceptual
clarification of the notion of dissociation, which also would deal with the relationships between
dissociation and precization and between dissociation and definition. Next, there is the question

1

Goodwin (1991, 1992) treats similarities between making a distinction and dissociation.
Schiappa (1985, 1993) points out the essentialistic basis of dissociation. Grootendorst (1999)
analyzes an example of unappropriate dissociation.
2

For criticism of Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca's taxonomy, see Van Eemeren et al. (1996).
1
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in which ways dissociation becomes evident in argumentative discourse. This necessitates
research into the various indicators which may signal the use of dissociation. Third, the question
rises in which ways the technique can be used dialogically in the negotiations between
protagonist and antagonist to bring about the solution of a conflict of opinion. This implies
empirical study of the contexts in which dissociation is used in argumentative discourse. Fourth,
one may ask what the dialectical and rhetorical consequences of the use of this technique are.
This means that a functional analysis of the use of the technique must be undertaken. And,
finally, one might want to know under which circumstances the technique is dialectically sound.
This would imply a study of dissociation from a normative dialectic point of view.
In this paper, I concentrate on the third question. I leave the matter of conceptual
clarification aside, for now (I feel justified in doing so, because, even though the boundaries
between distinction and dissociation are not clear, in the context of an argument, both techniques
may be used in the same way). I will explore the dialogue contexts in which dissociation is used,
and the consequences of that use for the resolution of the conflict of opinion around which the
discussion revolves. In addition, I will make some remarks with regard to the matter of the
dialectical and rhetorical effects of the use of dissociation in these contexts. The material for the
analysis consists of various kinds of texts: newspaper and radio interviews, discussions,
parliamentary debates, argumentative newspaper articles, and newspaper articles in which
discussions are rendered or reported upon.
Dialogue contexts of dissociation in solving a difference of opinion
Dissociation can occur in various stages of the process of solving a difference of opinion: in
the confrontation stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage of a critical
discussion. In all cases dissociation is a move which brings the discussion back to the opening
stage, since dissociation brings about a change in the starting points of the discussion. This is
because through dissociation an existing and accepted conceptual unity which in some way or
another serves as a point of departure for the discussion, is broken up.
The technique can be used both by the protagonist (defending), and the antagonist
(attacking) of a standpoint. That results in several possibilities for placement in the succession of
moves in the discussion.
Confrontation stage
In the confrontation stage, the protagonist can use dissociation to reply to criticism against
his standpoint. The antagonist can use it to criticize the standpoint of the protagonist.3

3

Strictly speaking, we cannot speak of protagonist and antagonist here, since in the
confrontation stage the roles of defending or attacking have not yet been distributed. But since
the one who brings forward a standpoint, usually will be the one who will take upon him- or
herself the task of defending it, and the one who questions it, the task of attacking it, for
briefness sake I use the terms in this context.

Argumentative Functions Of Dissociation In Every-Day Discussions

3

Defending
An example of the use of dissociation for the defense in the confrontation stage can be found
in the following passage of a newspaper report of a feud between Eurocommissar Frits
Bolkestein and TV personality Fons de Poel.
[Fragment 1]
Eurocommissar Frits Bolkestein must stop his accusations against Netwerk
presenter Fons de Poel. In addition, he must publish a different rectification in
Vrij Nederland [a weekly magazine – MAvR]. This is what De Poel's attorney
demanded, this past Friday before the court in Amsterdam, in a case against
Bolkestein.
The latter accused the Netwerk presenter some time ago in Vrij Nederland of
making a fraudulent declaration against him with the IRS 'and, as you know, this
is a crime'. According to his attorney, N. Meijering, De Poel never made a
declaration, 'let alone a fraudulent one'.
Bolkestein earlier did place a rectification in VN. In this, he says: 'I meant
"fraudulent declaration" not in the technical sense of the word, but in the sense of
cooperating in giving a patently false impression of things with regard to my tax
declaration'. [De Volkskrant, November 13, 1999.]

Bolkestein has presented the standpoint that De Poel made a fraudulent declaration. De Poel
denies this. Bolkestein agrees that De Poel did not make a fraudulent declaration in the technical
sense of the word, but persists in his opinion through making a dissociation: he states that De
Poel made a fraudulent declaration in another, 'non-technical' sense. The dissociation is brought
about by distinguishing two meanings, one of which is new, of the term 'fraudulent declaration'.
In the next example, too, the protagonist responds to criticism against his standpoint with a
dissociation, albeit that the standpoint here is a virtual one (for the term 'virtual standpoint', see
Jackson 1992). Only, in this case the protagonist does not persist in his original opinion, but
gives it up. The fragment comes from a radio interview with the public relations officer of the
Public Prosecutor of Rotterdam, in which he announces that Rotterdam, unlike Groningen, will
not prohibit posting an offending poster by the artist Serrano whose work is exhibited in
Groningen:
[Fragment 2]
W:

yeah well this is the Rotterdam point of view what I just told you

I:
isn't it a bit strange that in a small country like The Netherlands such
diverging opinions reign between two large cities?
W:
eh well for the moment yes you assume that there is a difference of
opinion it could very well be the case that in practice in the end it will lead to the
same result

An implicature of Wesseling's first utterance is that Rotterdam has an opinion of its own.
When the interviewer questions the desirability of this, Wesselings distances himself from this
implicature; he says that 'in practice' there is no difference of opinion between the two cities. He
makes a dissociation between opinions in the abstract, and opinions in practice.
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Attacking
An example of the antagonist using dissociation as an attack in the confrontation stage is
offered by the following passage from a newspaper interview with a grand-daughter of Maria
Montessori.
[Fragment 3]
That her grandmother is known for being ambitious and vain, she also deems
irrelevant. And incorrect, as well. 'She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain.
She had the gift of a profound scholarly modesty. She was driven, something
different from ambition. She saw the education of the children of this world as
her task. Rather, she was a medium. I remember that in a discussion with my
father she picked up a book by herself and said: "Look, it says here". So not: I
say. She relayed what she knew'. [De Volkskrant, October 5, 1999]

Renilde Montessori attacks the standpoint that her grandmother was vain by making a
dissociation between 'loving beautiful clothes' and 'being vain'. Subsequently she gives an
argument for the standpoint that Montessori was not vain. She does the same with regard to the
standpoint that Montessori was ambitious. There she dissociates between being 'driven' and
'ambition', and subsequently gives arguments for the standpoint that Montessori was driven and
for the standpoint that it was not the case that she was ambitious. The pairs of concepts which are
dissociated here, in ordinary speech generally are considered to be identical. The dissociation is
brought about by opposing the two aspects which are distinguished (p', but not p), and by
denying their similarity (p' which is something different from p).
The same dissociative technique is applied in the following example. In a newspaper
interview with the soccer player Jonk, the latter suggests that the level of play at the Sheffield
soccer club, to which he was transferred, is below what he was used to.
[Fragment 4]
A good, elegant soccer player thus started to play below his level. 'At that time
that was a choice, because I had few other options'. But he has no regrets. 'It's a
pity, but a pity is something else than regret'. [De Volkskrant, August 18, 1999]

From the summary of the interviewer in the first sentence, and Jonk's reaction in the second,
one might deduce that he regrets his choice. However, that is a standpoint which the player does
not subscribe to. He attacks it by dissociating between feeling something is a pity and feeling
regret. In ordinary speech the two concepts, which here are placed in opposition, usually are
regarded as identical.
Argumentation stage
In the argumentation stage, dissociation is always used to attack an argument of another
party. In a non-mixed difference of opinion, the antagonist can attack the protagonist's argument;
in a mixed difference of opinion, the protagonist of the one standpoint can attack as an antagonist
the argument of the protagonist of the opposite standpoint. In the latter case, the protagonist
gives an indirect defense of his own standpoint, but that makes no difference for the attacking
character of the move. Dissociation can be used in two ways: to attack the tenability of the
argument, or to attack the connection between argument and standpoint.
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Tenability of the argument
When the tenability of the argument is attacked, dissociation is used in the way which
Garssen specifies, in order to attack a starting point for applying an argumentation scheme. In
principle, an attack on the tenability of an argument through dissociation does not differ from
such an attack on the tenability of a standpoint. Yet it is worthwhile to investigate it on its own,
because the attack does indeed have consequences for the application of the argumentation
scheme.
In the symptomatic scheme, the starting point consists in declaring an entity equivalent to
another entity or class of entities (such that the characteristics of the latter are conveyed to the
former). This equivalence can be attacked through dissociation. That is what happens in the
following example. Minister Jorritsma has been called to book in Parliament because she wants
to adapt the allowable noise levels for Schiphol airport. Parliament is of the opinion that
adaptation is the same as tolerating that the standards are exceeded, and had the minister earlier
not asserted that such a policy of tolerance should no longer be put into force? The symptomatic
argument which Parliament applies is: adaptation is not to be allowed, because adaptation comes
down to tolerating, and tolerating is no longer an allowable option. The minister defends her
policy in the following manner:
[Fragment 5]
According to Jorritsma, the cabinet will not revert to a tolerance policy, as it was
applied in 1997. 'That was once, but never again, we said at the time. But
tolerating is something quite different from anticipating on a change of law which
everybody thinks should be put into effect.' [De Volkskrant, January 22, 1998]

Jorritsma contests the argument that adapting the allowable noise levels is the same as
carrying out a tolerance policy. She dissociates between tolerance and anticipating a change of
law which everybody thinks should be put into effect. The dissociation consists in distinguishing
two aspects of the same thing: allowing the violation of current legal regulations. The
dissociation serves to attack the starting point of the symptomatic argument which Parliament
brings forward.
In pragmatic argumentation, the starting point for the argument posits a causal relationship.
The starting point for this causal relationship can be attacked as well. That is what happens in the
following fragment from a parliamentary debate about the voluntary resignation of Minister
Peper after rumors of financial malversation during his period as Mayor of Rotterdam.
[Fragment 6]
Mr. Marijnissen (SP): I gladly will do so, because it is the task of a member of
Parliament to bring to light inconsistencies and that is what we have a case of
when we are talking about 'the interest of public administration'. In the interest of
public administration Peper, according to his own say-so, has taken his decision.
The prime minister has said that in the interest of public administration it is better
to fight back in this kind of situation. He also said that in the interest of public
administration it would be sheer folly to resign only on the basis of rumors and
insinuations from anonymous sources. All this raises the question whether Mr.
Peper in resigning does not do a disservice to public administration, because with
regard to those insinuations and facts nothing has changed.
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Prime Minister Kok: I understand your observation and Minister Peper certainly
will have taken that into account in his own considerations. It is good that there is
an exchange on this matter, but it seems to me some distinction must be made
between imputations against people in office against which they can defend
themselves and the consequences which can or can not be drawn from that, that
is, more in general, and the indeed very special situation which is in evidence
here, namely that now no other than the Minister of Interior Affairs, the first one
responsible for public administration, possibly for a longer period would be a
party, could be discredited if only in connection with being a party, in a situation
regarding the accountability for expenses related to his past, to his former
responsibility. That is a different case, if I may say so. That is something
different from an incidental accusation, a reproach, a publication or certain
outcomes of an investigation, which, by the way, may very well be extremely
irritating, but against which one can defend oneself. If one really has the
impression that one will be a party in a conflict in which these two roles will
completely be mixed up, possibly will stay mixed up, and will increase being
discredited, mind you: if it has to do with the responsible minister for public
administration, than that is something essentially different.

Marijnissen points out an inconsistency: Prime Minister Kok earlier had defended the
standpoint that Minister Peper should stay in office, because that would be in the interest of
public administration; now he agrees with Peper that he should not stay in office in the name of
that same interest. Kok defends his current standpoint through dissociating between staying on in
a situation of incidental accusations and staying on in a situation in which one would be
discredited for a longer period. In the former case, it would serve the interest of public
administration, in the latter, it would not.
Connection between argument and standpoint
When dissociation is used to attack the connection between argument and standpoint, this
can be done in several ways. These possibilities correspond with the types of critical questions
which can be asked with regard to the application of the various argument schemes:
does X result in/ is X characteristic for/ is X comparable to Z?
does X not result in/ is X not characteristic for/ is X not comparable to something
else than Z?
is it X, and not something else, which results in/ is characteristic for/ is
comparable to Z?

The first critical question regards the connection as such: it denies that such a connection
exists. The second critical question concerns the second member of the relationship. The third
critical question concerns the first member of the relationship.
The first critical question
The first critical question attacks the heart of the relationship: the existence of a connection
is denied. This means that the association which is made by the other party is undone. Such an
attack usually is only dissociative in the wider sense of the term, since in the relationship (X
results in/is comparable to/ is characteristic of Z) two independent, different entities are brought
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together. But when the attack is directed against the connection in a symptomatic scheme in
which identity is claimed, the attack is dissociative in the proper sense of the term, separating
into two entities something which is regarded as one and the same thing. In such a case the
scheme is used as follows: X is Y because X is Z and Z is the same as/comes down to/means Y.
The attack involves the breaking up of this identity. An example can be found in the following
fragment from a radio broadcast of a press conference in which the director of a hospital is
questioned about an allegation of culpable negligence.
[Fragment 7]
S:
it is not correct that in our hospital fatal consequences have occurred on
account of culpable negligence in our medical treatment ((…))
I:
one of the complaints for instance that was filed could be heard in the
program here the story was told of a patient who asked six times for a
gynaecologist which did not come all that time but according to the hospital this
does not say anything about culpable negligence.
S:
a complaint was filed that was treated by the grievance committee and
they declared the complaint justified ((…)) the complaint was filed with reason
which means that the gynaecologist should have responded earlier to the request
of the nursing staff
I:

so culpable negligence after all?

S:
I made a distinction between a complaint, a justified complaint and
culpable negligence

I applies the symptomatic argument that a justified complaint is the same as culpable
negligence. S denies that identity, and dissociates between the two.
The second critical question
The second critical question is used to attack the application of the argument scheme by
pointing out that the argument leads to/is comparable to/ is characteristic of something else than
what is postulated. That distinction can be prepared through a dissociation in the second member
of the relationship. An example in which this is the case with regard to a causal relationship can
be found in the following fragment of a newspaper interview with a genetic biologist on cloning.
[Fragment 8]
The discomfort at cloning of humans seems to me to be the product of a
confusion between the notions 'identical people' and 'genetically identical people'.
When you have two genetically identical flower bulbs, you can exchange the one
for the other without any problem: genetically identical for bulbs means identical.
In other words: the value of an individual bulb decreases, the more genetically
identical ones there are. One black tulip is very special. But if the Keukenhof is
full of them, no tourist will come and look at them.
But people are not bulbs. The value and dignity of people is not determined by
their genetic make-up, but by the fact of them being humans. Or are identical
twins (a 'natural' clone!) worth less than two 'ordinary' brothers? Someone
married to half of a twin wouldn't want to exchange the one for the other, would
they?
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There is a simple reason for that: 'genetically identical' in humans is something
quite different from 'identical'. Individuality does not reside in the genes.
That is why humanity or human dignity is not threatened by cloning as such. That
only happens if we start to value people differently on the basis of their genes. As
happens now, already as well, by the way, under the name of 'racism'. [De
Volkskrant, April 11, 1997]

The speaker contests the viewpoint of people who reject human cloning because it would
lead to identical people (and thus loss of human dignity). The causal relationship which underlies
the argument of these opponents is attacked through dissociating between identical and (merely)
genetically identical: cloning produces humans with only the latter characteristic, not the former.
In a symptomatic scheme, too, the second member of the relationship can be attacked
through dissociation. An example can be found in the following (reported) conversation
fragment.
[Fragment 9]
A:

he is a good manager

B:

well, he certainly couldn't prevent that subsidy cut-off

A:

yes, he isn't a good crisis manager, but as a general manager he's just fine

B uses the symptomatic argument that not being able to prevent a subsidy cut-off is a sign of
not being a good manager. A attacks that connection by dissociating between management and
crisis management and by claiming that not being able to prevent a subsidy cut-off is not a sign
of not being a good manager, but of something different, namely, of not being a good crisis
manager.
The third critical question
The third critical question attacks the relationship between argument and standpoint by
pointing out that it is not that which is stated in the argument, but something else that leads to the
postulated result/ is comparable to the postulated object/ has the postulated characteristic. That
distinction can be prepared through a dissociation in the first member of the relationship. An
example is offered by the following fragment from the television debate program 'De
Worsteling'. Film maker Ate de Jong claims that producer Matthijs van Heijningen has lost his
passion. Van Heijningen tries to refute this claim by pointing out that he is producing no less
than four movies at that moment in time.
[Fragment 10]
dJ:

I think that Matthijs's flame has subsided (…)

vH:
well ((mentions four movies he is producing at that moment))…. no
certainly not, no no just just
dJ:
yes but I have the feeling that Matthijs does this because he is a producer
and is supposed to do something again, not because he really wants to do that
specific production

Van Heijningen makes use of a symptomatic argument scheme: producing a lot of movies
points to passion. De Jong attacks the first member of the relationship which the scheme applies
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by dissociating between movies which are produced because the producer really wants to, and
movies which are produced because the producer has to. Only producing the first type shows that
the producer has not lost his passion. De Jong does not contest that Van Heijningen is producing
four movies (in this sense he does not contest the tenability of the starting point), but he does
contest that Van Heijningen produces the kind of movies which enables the application of the
symptomatic relationship.
The concluding stage
In the concluding stage, dissociation can be used to give a precization of the conclusion that
was reached. In the material I have only found an example of a distinction being used in this
fashion, but the use of dissociation in a similar move can be easily envisioned. The example
comes from a parliamentary debate, in which Minister of Justice Korthals discussed the
desirability of an amendment proposed by Mrs. Halsema purporting to set up a right to complain
for youthful detainees. MP Rouvoet wants to know what the outcome of the debate exactly is.
[Fragment 11]
Minister Korthals: Mr. Chairman! I think it will not go like this. I gave my
arguments against this amendment. If the members see a lot of advantages in
accepting it, they should vote in favor of it.
Mr. Rouvoet: Mr. Chairman! I find this an important matter. The minister says
that he has given his arguments against acceptance of the amendment. However, I
want a clarification after the debate with Mrs. Halsema. Is the minister against
the amendment because in his opinion article 65, 1, already comprises that a
youth in certain cases can file a complaint against the decision of a selection
officer to use violence, or does the minister think that this right to complain can
not be considered part of it because a youth should not be allowed to complain
against the use of violence which a selection officer has decided on?
Minister Korthals: No. In principle I am of the opinion that everyone should be
able to complain if in any way violence is used against them. If a selection officer
in any way acts wrongly, the decision which he has taken can be tested by
another authority. That authority can evaluate the decision of the selection
officer, also in the case of the application of violence, and pronounce on it.
Mr. Rouvoet It comes down to this: you feel that it should be possible to file a
complaint, but you do not think that there is an omission. That is what the
argument of Mrs. Halsema was about. So you do not agree with her that in article
65 an omission is made.
Minister Korthals: I think I have been clear in this.

Member of Parliament Rouvoet makes a distinction between two potential conclusions from
the debate and asks which one the minister subscribes to. The minister commits himself to one of
the two interpretations.
Dialectical and rhetorical effects
The dialectical effects of a dissociation depend on the question in which stage and by which
party the dissociation was made. The rhetorical effects, as well, to some degree are determined
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by this. But there are also more general remarks which can be made about the rhetorical effects
of dissociation.
As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out, dissociation is used to prevent or remedy an
inconsistency. As we have seen in the above, this needs not always be an inconsistency in the
position of the speaker him- or herself. It may also be an opposition between a conclusion which
might be drawn from the given starting points, and the conclusion which the speaker would like
to draw.
Another inherent rhetorical effect is that through dissociation a term receives redefinition.
And by substituting the new definition for the old one, a different picture is given of the state of
affairs. As Schiappa phrases it: [dissociation] 'solidifies one conception of reality while
undermining rival conceptualizations' (1985, 80). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca state that
[dissociation] 'remodels our conception of reality' (1969, 416). And since dissociation involves
the application of a hierarchy of values, the evaluation of the state of affairs is changed as well.
The rhetorical effects of dissociation are enhanced because the dissociation usually is
presented as self-evident and is introduced without further argument. Since dissociation changes
the conceptual starting points which protagonist and antagonist share, the acceptability of a
dissociation certainly is a point of debate, potentially requiring a sub-discussion (Grootendorst
1999). But through presenting the dissociation as self-evident, the opponent is confronted with a
fait accompli, on which it is difficult re-open the discussion.
Confrontation stage
Defending
A dissociation in the confrontation stage can be used by the protagonist in two ways. First, P
persists in his standpoint after the antagonist's criticism, while at the same time admitting that the
antagonist is right. P says as much as: in one sense, you are right, and I have to withdraw my
standpoint, in another sense I persist in my opinion and disagree with you. The latter sense is
what I really meant. An example is fragment (1), Bolkestein's manoeuvering with the term
fraudulent declaration. The dialectical effect is that the protagonist retracts his original
standpoint, and shifts the difference of opinion to a different standpoint. A rhetorical effect is
that the speaker withdraws to a different standpoint, which is easier for him to defend, and that
without seeming to give up his original position. Both dialectical and rhetorical effects are
clearly illustrated in the sequel to the example, in which the responses of the lawyers of both
Bolkestein and De Poel (in that order) are related.
According to his lawyer, with this statement he takes back the term 'fraudulent declaration'.
De Poel does not agree. His lawyer Meijering deems the text unclear and is of the opinion
that Bolkestein does not distance himself from the allegations. 'When you read closely, he says
the exact opposite'.
Bolkestein's lawyer describes the dialectic effect of Bolkestein retracting his original
standpoint; De Poel's lawyer complains about the rhetorical effect of Bolkestein persisting in his
accusation.
The second way of using dissociation in defense in the confrontation stage is in effect when
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P withdraws his original standpoint after criticism of the antagonist, but acts as if that does not
mean a change. P says as much as: originally my words were used in the one sense, now I am
saying the same thing, but then in another sense, in which I agree with what you are saying. An
example is fragment (2), in which the public relations officer of the Public Prosecutor of
Rotterdam renounces the virtual standpoint he is committed to that Rotterdam has a position of
its own. The dialectic effect is that there is no longer a difference of opinion, because the
protagonist gives up his original standpoint and goes along with the opposite standpoint. The
rhetorical effect is that the speaker wriggles out from something which he is committed to, while
disguising the fact that he takes the opposite standpoint to the one which he originally took. He
acts as if it is just a matter of a shade of meaning.
Whether the protagonist uses dissociation to maintain his standpoint or to relinquish it, in
both cases the rhetorical effect is that he defends against a potential accusation of inconsistency.
In addition, in both cases a redefinition is achieved, and the definition which the speaker chooses
to use is given priority.
Attacking
A dissociation by the antagonist in the confrontation stage dialectically has the effect that
the antagonist brings forward not just the opposite standpoint to that of the protagonist, but
another one as well. The difference of opinion is made into a multiple mixed difference. The
rhetorical effect is that the speaker sweeps the original standpoint off the table and brings about a
shift in the question that the difference of opinion is about. The force with which this is done is
increased by the fact that the dissociation is often presented as self-evident. Fragment (4), in
which soccer player Jonk denies regrets about his choice, presents a clear example: no argument
is given.
The dissociation brings about a redefinition of the crucial terms, while invoking a value
hierarchy. The qualification which is used in the standpoint which is attacked is considered
negative, and possessed with negative implications. The dissociation is used to attack these
negative qualifications and implications. By positing a different qualification, with positive
connotations, a positive judgement comes in place of the negative judgement. This goes for
Montessori's personality, as well as for Jonk's emotional state: the latter suffers less loss of face
by substituting the dissociated concept 'a pity' for the original 'regrets' (if he regretted his
decision he would have to admit that he took a wrong decision which he would like to reverse).
Argumentation stage
The dialectical and rhetorical effects of an attack against the argument of the opponent
depend on whether or not the attack takes place within the context of a mixed difference of
opinion. In a non-mixed dispute, the dissociation is purely offensive, in a mixed dispute, an
indirect defense of the standpoint of the speaker is attempted at the same time.
Mixed
In a mixed dispute, the dialectical effect of an attack on the argumentation of an antagonist
is that the protagonist gives an indirect defense of his standpoint, as well. The general rhetorical
effect is that of any indirect defense: while the standpoint still stands in need of a defense, the
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attention is shifted to the standpoint of the other party.
When the dissociation is directed against the tenability of the opponent's argument, the
speaker attacks the starting point of the argumentation. The protagonist accepts that the
conclusion which the antagonist draws can be inferred from the starting point, but he denies the
tenability of that starting point. A rhetorical effect is that the speaker wriggles out from a
consequence which he would have been committed to otherwise, without being able to be
accused of inconsistency. An example occurs in the Schiphol debate (example 5). Jorritsma tries
to escape the consequence which she could be held committed to on the basis of her earlier
statements ('once but never again'). She achieves this by denying the tenability of the starting
point through a dissociation involving a redefinition of the term 'tolerance policy'. The same type
of thing happens in the Peper debate (6). In both cases, the speaker made earlier statements in
virtue of which he could be held committed to the conclusion which the opposing party draws
and which he subsequently denies.
When the dissociation is aimed against the argumentation scheme which the other party
applies, the speaker does not reject the argument as such, he accepts the argument, but tries to
establish that it is irrelevant for the standpoint which the opponent brought forward. A rhetorical
effect of the dissociation is that the speaker wriggles out from under a conclusion which he could
be held committed to on the basis of the acceptance of the argument. The more established the
connection which the application of the argumentation scheme invokes, the more difficult this is.
When the speaker attacks the first member of the relationship, he tries to wriggle out from under
a starting point which he can not very well deny. He does so by suggesting that the starting point
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion which the antagonist wishes to draw, notably through
dissociating an aspect leading to an exception to the postulated relationship. Again, a rhetorical
effect is that the speaker escapes an accepted connection, while defending himself against an
accusation of inconsistency. De Jong cannot deny that Van Heijningen is producing movies, but
through the dissociation he establishes that they are not the type of movies which warrant the
conclusion which his opponent wishes to draw (10). When the speaker attacks the second
member of the relationship, as in (8) and (9), another rhetorical effect occurs, as well: the
speaker agrees with his opponent on a point which he makes into a minor point, and for the
major matter claims his standing in the right.
Non-mixed
In a non-mixed dispute, in the argumentation stage, dissociation is used only as an attack on
the protagonist's argument. In an attack on the tenability of the argument, the dialectical and
rhetorical effects are the same as those of an attack on the tenability of the standpoint of the
protagonist, only on a lower level. The argument is forcefully swept from the table; on the sublevel a mixed multiple dispute is brought into existence. Rhetorically, the effect is that the
argument is depicted as concerned with an unimportant, unessential aspect of the matter. So far, I
have not found any examples of this use of dissociation, but it can easily be imagined. Thus the
following hypothetical dialogue might be imagined.
[Fragment 12]
A:

she is the right candidate for this job

B:

how so?
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well, she is a very good manager

B:

how can you say so, she is merely a good crisis manager

13

B attacks the tenability of A's argument by making a dissociation between management and
crisis management.
When the antagonist attacks the argumentation scheme, he denies that the postulated
conclusion follows. An example is offered by the following response by minister Van Aartsen to
reports about Minister of Finance Zalm not mentioning new sums.
[Fragment 13]
Van Aartsen reacted irritably to reports that Zalm according to his spokesman did
not mention new sums. 'A spokesman is not the same as the minister', according
to Van Aartsen. [De Volkskrant, March 23, 1999]

Reports express the opinion that Zalm did not mention new sums, invoking the authority of
his spokesperson. Van Aartsen attacks that symptomatic relationship through a dissociation
between the word of a spokesperson and the word of the minister (which ordinarily are supposed
to coincide). He does not deny that the spokesperson said what the reports say, but he contests
that this means that the minister in actual fact did not mention new sums. Once again, the
argument of the opponent is forcefully swept from the table, without further argument.
Conclusions
The above investigation of the dialogical contexts in which dissociation occurs, shows that
dissociation can be used in a variety of ways. But it always is used in reaction to the standpoint
or argument of another party. It is a typically dialogual technique. That is why it is important to
describe the dialogual possibilities of the use of this technique and the dialectical and rhetorical
effects of that use in the various places in the dialogical profile in which it can occur.
Dissociation does indeed, as some authors pointed out earlier, not function as an argument
scheme. What this investigation further shows, is that it may be used as an argumentative
technique in the confrontation, in the argumentation, and in the concluding stages of a critical
discussion. In the confrontation stage, it may be used both in maintaining and relinquishing
standpoints, and in attacking standpoints. In the argumentation stage, it may be used to attack the
argument, as well as the argument scheme of the opponent, and the latter in various ways,
corresponding to the critical questions that may be asked about the scheme. In the concluding
stage, dissociation may be used to precizate or to bring about a shift in the conclusion which is
drawn from the preceding discussion.
The dialectical and rhetorical effects of the use of dissociation were only marginally touched
upon in this paper. Further investigation is necessary. But it does transpire that dissociation plays
an important role in shifting the discussion in the direction which the speaker desires, while at
the same time, in many cases, protecting the speaker against an accusation of inconsistency.
As I indicated in the beginning, there is a lot more to be learnt about dissociation: its
conceptual boundaries, the way in which it manifests itself, and the degree to which its use is
acceptable in a dialectical framework, all these are topics for further enquiry. In later
publications I hope to report on findings with regard to these topics.
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